We develop an expected utility model to analyse the demand for agricultural insurance covering yield losses. In the simplest case, using CARA preferences, we show that the demand for insurance depends on the product price variability and on the correlation between yield and price. If premim subsidies and farm program subsidies are sufficiently high, insurance may be attractive even if the indemnnity scheme does not compensate for the cost of the premium. In a more general case, with DARA-CRRA preferences, we show that insurance is more sensitive to incorrectly calculated premia when prices are more volatile and when price and yield are negatively correlated. In the second part, we use the actual insurance records of 55,000 farmers and 11 years to estimate two sets of insurance demands. We define measures of insurance's expected returns, variance and third moment, based on observed insurance data, and infer the expected returns for those farmers that have never had an indemnity. We estimate several probit models and count models for the insuring vs non-insuring strategies, in which the economic returns of insurance and its two measures of dispersion enter as explanatory variables. Results show that farmers' insurance strategies are largely explained by their actual insurance experience as captured by these three variables. Individuals with loss rations greater than 1 do not show more responsiveness that those facing more balanced premium charges. Results show that adverse selection may not be a major source of inefficiency in the Spanish insurance system.
Introduction
The literature on agricultural insurance seems to provide very few succesful examples. Most conclusions are based on a very limited number of experiences and countries, which mostly focus on publicly provided insurance. Most world countries, developed and developing, have agricultural insurance systems or have gone through processes of development, crises, and revitalisation.
Conventional wisdom assumes that agricultural insurance is too vulnerable to serious problems of asymetric information (Just & Pope, 2002; Chambers, 1989) . In the European Union, the private sector provides basic coverages for a very limited number of hazards, indicating that many of the risks and hazards to which farmers are exposed cannot be insured by private insurance companies. Yet, a number of countries have developed large and comprehensive insurance policies as a means to provide safety nets for farmers. In the last ten years, the US, Spain, and Canada, among others, have expanded their insurance systems in terms of insured risks, kinds of policies, and their budgetary allocations to subsidise premia. The European Commission has recently launched a reflection period to analyse alternatives to increase the EU's involvement in developing risk management instruments, including agricultural insurance.
Despite its importance in terms of insured acreage, total liabilities and premium subsidies, very little is known about non-US insurance experiences, with the exception of Canada and a number of policy review works (OECD, 2002; EC commission, 2000) . The Spanish case is especially striking because it has a rich experience in developing new and innovative agricultural insurance, and has been expanding during the last 25 years. And yet it has received scant attention in the literature, and completely ignored as an alternative model to countries in the process of developing their own systems. This paper focuses on Spain's agricultural insurance policies. It seeks to characterise the demand for insurance in Spain and determine the extent to which it is vulnerable to problems of asymetric information. By looking at a wide range of crops and insurance mechanisms, it seeks to offer a fresh look at agricultural insurance in general and fill the gaps that prevent a more informed view of this important safety net. The paper develops a new modeling approach that provides testable hypotheses about farmers' insurance demand, which are tested by simulation models, statistical and econometric methods.
The paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the literature on insurance demand in section 2, we provide a brief description of the Spanish agricultural insurance system and primary factual data in the third section. Section 4 includes the basic model for insurance demand. In section 5 we provide numerical results that enrich the theoretical conclusions.
Section 6 describes the database used in the statistical and econometric analyses, whose results are discussed in section 7. The paper's most salient conclusions are summarised in section 8.
Literature review on insurance demand
Canada, Spain and the US are among the OECD countries with more developed agricultural insurance policies. The three of them have in the last decade increased the budget devoted to premium subsidisation, and the pecentages of farmers and surface with some coverage. As rough measures, these countries spend in subsidising insurance policies an equivalent of 1 to 2% of their total agricultural output. In response to these significant budgets allocation, about 50 to 60% of the eligible farmers purchase at least one insurance policy. On average, US spends in insurance subsidies about US$25 per insured hectare, Spain €25, and Canada C$50.
Insurance subsidisation, though important in absolute and relative terms, is not the only means the governments of these countries support agricultural insurance. Agencies directly or indirectly promote research and support continuous innovation, offering a broad menu of insurance options to field crops, fruits & vegetables and livestock farmers.
While the US insurance policy has inspired hundreds of articles and books, the Canadian and the Spanish ones have motivated remarkable fewer works. Yet, as a whole and in view of the variety of experiences and long history, they offer a wealth of results, conclusions as well as unexplored research questions.
Farmers purchase insurance polices because (1) expected benefits are positive, (2) they gain from asymmetric information, and (3) they are risk-averse (Just et al. 2003) . The bulk of the literature on agricultural insurance has focused on items (1) and (2), that have been tested under alternative assumptions about item (3).
With insurance, asymetric information implies that insuree and insurer have different information about productive risks and insuree's behaviour. Asymetric information is thought to provide incentives for moral hazard and adverse selection. Quiggin et al. (1993) contend that very often it is not possible to empirically distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection, however different may be in theoretical terms. Consider the case of a farmer that defers his planting to learn more about soil-moisture and see whether it is in his interest to purchase drought insurance. This type of behaviour is illustrative of both moral hazard and adverse selection. It exhibits adverse selection because insurance is purchased only if a lower yield is expected. It is moral hazard because the decision to defer planting is influenced by the existence of yield insurance. Moschini and Hennessy (2001) review in detail the problems related to asymetric information. What this wealth of literature, entirely based on US cases and data, seems to suggest is that there is disagreement about whether or not asymetric information pose incentives to increase production. In the following section, we review some of theses works.
On moral hazard
Wright and Hewitt (1990, cited by Moschini and Hennessy, 2001) contend that actual demand for insurance would be lower than is generally believed, because farmers have many other cheaper means to control and reduce their risks. In general, insurance is thought to be an expensive RMI, because policies have to be designed in order to reduce the negative effects of asymetric information. As a result, in the absence of subsidies insurance would not be attractive to most farmers. Ramaswami (1993) divide up insurance effects in two: moral hazard effects and risk reduction effects. The first encourages reductions of input use and by the second the insuree would seek greater expected revenue. However, there is some ambiguity with regards to moral hazard effects, because increase-production inputs can be also risk-augmenting. In general, it is thought that fertilisers are risk-augment inputs, and pesticides risk-reduction inputs.
However, insurance policies include a number of provision and features that are meant to reduce or eliminate moral hazard, but adding little room for risk reduction effects. In Table 1 , we offer a summary of the main literature results about moral hazard.
On adverse selection
Combating adverse selection is paramount to being able to offer specific insurance policies to relatively homogenous groups of farmers. For this, insurers must count on objectively discriminatory elements to group agents under homogenous risk levels, and charge different premia. While the confirmation of moral hazard would lead to the conclusion that insurance is a decoupled policy, the presence of adverse selection needs not be so. What adverse selection indicates is the absence of discrimination elements and the unbalance of premia and indemnities. If adverse-selection provides strong incentives to cultivate marginal land, then insurance may increase production and for that matter should not qualify as a decoupled policy.
Yet, as Moschini and Hennessy (2001) indicate the Canadian Prairie Farm Assistance Act (1939) was conceived to grant revenue instability of farmers located in territories to which they should have never been pushed to occupy. While this may be true in many other countries and regions, the passage of time since land was converted to agriculture precludes qualifying these historical processes as adverse-selection. This, despite the fact premium must be heavily subsidised to maintain farmers' interest. Another important factor related to adverse selection is the fact that the required groups' homogeniety to avoid adverse selection depends on farmers' risk aversion. The more risk-averse, the less reluctant they will be to pay premium above their individual actuarial fair premium. Table 2 includes a number of studies that have addressed the problem of adverse selection
In short, the evidence in favour a severe asymetric information problems is dubious and mostly based on a limited number of US insurance policies (MCPI and APH). The literature seems to suggest that farmers seem to be compelled to purchase insurance attracted by the expected results, which are also dependent on the level of insurance attached to the premium (Just et al. 1999) . Makki & Somwaru (2001) show high risk US farmers are more likely to purchase revenue insurance and higher coverage levels, and that low-risk farmers tend to be overcharged.
A controversial issue about the role of subsidies in the demand for insurance still revolves and has not been settled in the literature. (Goodwin 2001, p. 543) finds demand elasticity for insurance is between -0.24 and -0.20. (Serra, Goodwin and Featherstone 2003, p. 109) show that it has be become less elastic in the US as farmers have turned to larger coverages, favoured by ARPA (2002) increased subsidisation.
The Agricultural Insurance system in Spain
Agricultural insurance in Spain dates back to the beginning of the 20 th century, but remained fairly unimportant and underwent various waves of decline and resurgence until 1978. This year saw the passing of the Agricultural Insurance Act which set the stage for a continuous growth of agricultural insurance in Spain. The Spanish system is based on a mixed public-private model, in which farmers' unions and association do also play a crucial role. Interested readers can learn a complete description of the Spanish insurance system in OECD and EU reports (OECD, 2001 & European Commission, 2000 . In Figure 1 , we plot the total liability of agricultural production, including livestock production, and the ratios of total expenditures in premium subsidisation over total liability. The graph shows the steady growth of the agricultural insurance, which now reaches about 30 to 40% of all eligible production. Farmers in Spain can choose among more than 200 different policies, that provide coverages to all possible crops and animal production. The system has evolved in the last 20 years to offer a wider menu of products to a wider range of crops and animal production. Premium are subsidised by the 
Model of insurance demand
With insurance, revenue is given by: 
Where y e is the trigger yield, and p e is the price established to evaluate the indemnity. Profit is given by s P c R
; with c, being the crop's cost; P n is the net premium; and s is an agricultural policy subsidy in the form of a direct aid. Insurance net premium, as paid by the farmer results from P n =(1+δ)(1-ξ) P f , where δ is the loading factor; ξ is the insurance subsidy;
and P f the fair premium, evaluated as follows: 
with γ, being the probabilty of getting a yield below y e . Under no insurance, expected utility is given by:
There are two possible strategies to compare the expected utilities of insurance vs. no insurance, both taking advantage of the moment generating function as in Colander and Zilberman (1985) . One, that relies on the assumption of independence between y and p, is to use the result of Glen et al. (2005) and compute the integral to obtain h(R), using equation 1, and get a closed form of ) ( i EU π and ) (π EU . This strategy is applicable to a limited number of cases, because the combination of pdfs for ỹ and p that ensure that function (1) can be integrated is limited to lognormal-lognormal, and beta-beta.
The alternative strategy is perhaps more restricting but more insightful. It is based on the assumption that R follows a continuous distribution function which has moment generating function. Obvious candidates are Gamma, Chi-squre or Normal distributions, but as we shall see below even assuming either distribution the comparison of expected utilities requires additional
functions. Yet, in the fourth section of the paper we show that for a wide range of pdfs for ỹ and p --including Beta, Gamma, Lognormal and Normal --a gamma distribution fits statistically well for the resulting R . (-r) is the moment generating function of R of order -r. The first bracketed term is the expected utility resulting from the insurance indemnity, whereas the second one is the difference between the expected utility without insurance and insurance resulting from stochastic revenue R .
Although condition 5 holds only for any pair of ramdon variables, ỹ and R , with pdfs with MGFs, to gain some intuition we focus on the particular case of ỹ and R following two Gamma distribution, with parameters (λ R , α R ) and (λ y , α y ) 4 . In Appendix 2, we show that condition 5 can be transformed to: 
where Im stands for indemnity (Im=p e (y e -y)). Condition 7 is intuitively clear: insurance is purchased if paying the premium is compensated with the utility gains resulting from the indemnity scheme. Note, however, that condition 7 is only necessary and is based on the assumption that P n -β'>0. If per hectare subsidy, s, is sufficiently high, or premium is intensively subsidised, then it may be the case that P n -β'= P n +c-s<0. In this case, necessary condition 7 no longer holds and equation 6 must hold to ensure that insurance is purchased. If premium is inexpensive relative to other costs, either because of subsidies or because risk is low, and direct subsidy is large, then insurance may be purchased even if inequality 7 is reversed. Furthermore, 4 Mean equal to α/λ; variance equal to α/λ 2 ; and moment-generating function of order t equal to 1/(1-t(1/λ)) α , for t<λ.
if P n -β'<0, then the exponent of the left-hand-side term in 6 switches from negative to positive.
So the larger the subsidies, the greater the incentives to purchase insurance. In the case s is relatively larger than P n +c, insurance would still be purchased even if condition 7 does not hold or even if the insurance policy is relatively inattractive.
An inspection of condition 6 shows that there are eleven parameters (p e , y e , r, δ, ξ, λ y , α y , λ R , α R , c, s) affecting the direction of inequality 6. To investigate the role of these parameters, we decompose ) ( i EU π in the indemnity scheme, EU(p e (y e -y)-P n -c+s), and the other containing the crop revenues, EU(py-P n -c+s). Furthermore, since δ and ξ play a similar role, we will drop the latter from the set of comparative analyses. Also, we grouped c−s in a single parameter c'.
In =(36.15, 8.85 ) with p-value 0.96 when ỹ and p are correlated with ρ=-0.8.
As Table 3 shows only in 4 out of nine possible cases signs can be established unambiguously. The reason for getting such poor analytical results is due to the fact that gamma functions are not symmetric, and that skewness cannot be a priori imposed on stochastic revenue, R . Furthermore, large a per hectare subsidy, s, can reverse the sign of the effect, as it is in the case for ∂EU(p e (y e -y)-P n -c+s)/∂r. This explains why the effect of the risk-aversion coefficient is also undefined.
The previous analysis is limitted for a number of reasons. First, DARA utility functions are assumed to provide more realistic representations of agents' preferences than CARA specifications. Secondly, we have assumed that of ỹ and R follow Gamma distribution functions with known parameters, which is certainly a very particular case of more general specifications. Third, we have assumed a very simplistic insurance policy, in which there are no deductibles and fair premium is evaluated under the assumption of perfect information. In the following section, we report some simulation results that relax some of the above assumptions.
And fourth, we have only computed the signs of the partial derivatives of ) ( i EU π .
Simulation results
Attempting to gain more insight with numerical analyses, we run a series of Monte-Carlo simulations with a model that relaxes some of the above assumptions. Instead of CARA, we assume DARA-CRRA preferences, with U(π)=π 1-r /1-r, and five levels of r (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5); yield follows a Gamma distribution with α y =3.5 and λ y =2, representing average yields of 1.925 T/ha; y e =1.925 T/ha (which due to asymetry comes with a γ ye =0.55); two price distributions, both following a Beta distribution with the same average 0.12 (1000 € per T) but with increasingly wider support as shown in Table 4 's first row; that price and yield are uncorrelated (ρ=0) or negatively correlated (ρ=−0.8). We also assume five levels for (1+λ)(1-ξ), ranging from 'very subsidised and/or low loading factor', (1+λ)(1-ξ)=0.25, to 'no subsidies and/or high loading factor', (1+λ)(1-ξ)=1.5. Cost minus subsidy is set at c−s=1300€ for all simulations.
Furthermore, in an attempt to gain insight into the role of a miscalculated premium, we run half of the simulations assuming a correct insurance premium (with P f =460 €), and half evaluated as if the premium had been evaluated for a gamma with α y =5.5 and λ y =2,86 (with P f =390 €). Upon simulation 10,000 ramdon pairs of y and p, we made pairwise comparisons of ) ( i EU π and ) (π EU using condition (8) obtaining 240 possible comparisons. In Table 4 , plus '+'
, and a minus sign '−' means otherwise.
Results confirm that if price and yields are negatively correlated, insuring is the best strategy for a wider range of assumptions and parameters than if they are independent. This is because revenue, R , is less asymmetric with ρ yp =-0.8 than with ρ yp =0, as shown in Figure 2 .
Secondly, miscalculating the premium is more influential if price and yields are correlated than if they are uncorrelated. This implies that miscalculated premia may have a larger impact with crops that are more vulnerable to basis risks, like droughts, which affect market prices. Thirdly, increasing price risk would be followed by less insuring if prices are uncorrelated with yield. If they are correlated, price risk does not alter the insuring vs. non-insuring ordering. In a final set of simulation results, not reported in the table, we confirm that lowering p e or y e by 40% reduces significantly the demand for insurance for all assumptions and parameters.
Data sources and documentation
The statistical and econometric analyses use data from the Spanish agricultural insurance system (ENESA). ENESA's records include individual farm data from 7 agricultural diverse comarcas (equivalent to US counties). The complete database includes 55,000 farmers and 11 years (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , with a complete characterisation of each farm's insurance strategy, paid premiums, premium subsidies, and collected indemnities. Table 5 Insurance demand analysis will be pursued along two different strategies, requiring the computation of different actuarial and behavioral variables. For the first set of analyses, we've generating a number of variables, that we first define and later on explain:
Insur it --binary (0,1) --if buys any insurance policy in year t. Exp_ben it -numerical (≥0) -a dimensionless measurement of the expected benefit resulting from purchasing insurance, computed with the following formula (i farmer, j comarca, k crop, t year):
where Ind ikt is the indemnity (€) and Pmium ikt is the premium paid (€), net of subsidies, for crop k and year t. Exp_ben provides an idea of the actual expected benefits in terms collected indemnities for one euro spent in purchasing insurance policies. We now discuss the meaning of each of the above variables, with a few caveats in mind.
First, our three variables are meant to provide a description of the insurance experience of each farmer, using his individual records as the main sources of information. Second, only when the records of a farmer are sparce or limited, we add in the insurance variables of his comarca to complete the evaluation of the variables. Third, because the three variables are built based on past recorded data our three variables have more explanatory power for the last years of the series. So no model insurance demand model will be tested for t<2000. Fourth, the three variables are indices, meant to provide relative measures of the insurance experience of the farmer, irrespectively of his farm's size, cropping patterns, profitability or location.
The first variable, Exp_ben it , is a typical loss ratio calculated individually along the insurance experience of the farmer. If for any given year it is greater than 1, that means that the farmer collected more indemnities up to year t-1 than the total premium paid up to t-1. Exp_ben it may be 0 if the farmer did not received an indemnity at up to year t-1. If the farmer had not purchased any insurance premium before year t (with t>2000), then Exp_ben it is missing and not used in the analysis. The fact that Exp_ben it =0 does not imply that the expected benefit of purchasing insurance is zero. So as an alternative formulation, we use the inferred measurement of expected benefit, Exp_ben_in it , which is based on a weighted average of the comarca's loss ratios of the crops he has purchased. Neither Exp_ben it nor Exp_ben_in it are perfect indicators of the expected returns of purchasing insurance, but our hypothesis is that they may be good enough to explain farmers' insurance strategies. Figure 3 plots the histograms of Exp_ben (only for those greater than 0, which total about 64% of all farms) and Exp_ben_in, both evaluated at the most recent year 2003. Table 6 reports the statistics of both variables for each comarca. The median in both cases is below 1 for all observations, and greater than 1 only in the comarca of Segria using the inferred measure of expected return (Exp_ben_in). This is an indication that adverse selection may not be significant in all comarcas.
The second and third variables, Var ijt and Third ijt , are by construction different from 0 for all farmers, irrespectively of their insurance experience. They are meant to provide a sense of the relative dispersion of the difference between collected indemnities and paid premiums. For this two variables we are assuming that, if the farmer did not purchase any policy in year t, an equivalent measurement of the dispersion of payoffs is provided by his comarca's. Note also that, due to β t the dispersion of the most recent years up to t ensures that Var ijt and Third ijt are evaluated so that more weight is put in those years. As these two variables are meant to provide an idea of the dispersion of the whole insurance experience of the farmer, they are evaluated taking into account the relative importance of each insured crop. Note, however, that Exp_ben it (or Exp_ben_in it , for that matter) and variables Var ijt and Third ijt provide a completely different description of the insurance experience of a farmer. While Exp_ben it provides a pure return of the money spent in purchasing insurance, Var ijt and Third ijt capture the relative dispersion of the payoffs.
Insurance demand models
Two approaches can be followed to estimate insurance demand models, each which its own variants and assumptions. In the first approach, we only look at the dichotomous choice of purchasing or not purchasing any insurance policy. In the second approach, we estimate a count model of the number of years between 2000 and 2003 farmers purchased any insurance.
In the first case, we assume a farmer will purchase any type of insurance in year t if:
where the explanatory variables are those defined in the previous section, which are entirely based on the farmer's past insurance experience. Variants of this model are estimated as a probit models 5 . The major difficulty of this approach is choosing the variable capturing the expected returns from insuring, namely, choosing an inferred or guessed variable or using the actual returns based on the farmer's records. Having no a priori clue of what is appropriate, we base our choice on the econometric results, models' predicting accuracy and goodness of fit. Table 7 reports the results for three specifications (Exp_ben_in, Exp_ben and Exp_ben using only farmers for whom Ind ikt ≠0 for any t). All runs have reasonable good sensitity and specificity indicators. These in turn are similar within the same models, indicating that both the 1s and the 0s are predicted with similar accuracy. Using either Exp_ben_in or Exp_ben does not change the insurance demand's models interpreted as a whole. If we use Exp_ben, only farmers who got an indemnity in the past, the model fits better and coefficients for this variable are greater.
The three variables capturing the insurance returns are strongly significant, and have stability across models and time specifications. Farmers seem to respond to their insurance experience, and the relative profitability of purchasing agricultural insurance.
In general farmers with loss ratios greater than 1 (Exp_ben>1) are assumed to benefit from low premium relative to their individual risks. In our database, 48% of the farmers who have collected an indemnity during the 11-year period belong to this category. The percentage is 29% if we take into account the 55,500 farmers. 
The role of premium subsidies and changes in the indemnities schemes
The literature on insurance demand is clear about the effect of premium subsidies. If, as all available evidence overwhelmingly shows, farmers respond to the economic incentives that agricultural insurance policies provide, they would necessarily respond to changes in the premium subsidies and to changes in the probability and size of insurance indemnities. Table 10 reports the percentage changes of predicted Insurance00_03 t for two of the poisson specifications reported on Table 9 , three levels of Exp_ben (Exp_ben_in) and three levels of
Var. By all measures shown in the table, the largest changes occur when the expected benefits are lower than 0.5, and for Var<1.5. This means that insurance demand is mostly sensitive to changes of expected revenue for farmers that have the largest variation of returns and lowest expected return levels. This is an indication that farmers may show more resposiveness to changes in premium subsidies when their loss ratios are lower and the indemnity scheme more instable.
Summary and conclusions
In this study, we have analysed the demand for agriculture insurance using a theoretical model and an empirical approach. Our theoretical model shows that agricultural insurance providing coverage for crop losses is dependent on the premium subsidies and the parameters of the yield distribution. Since indemnities are generally evaluated as the product of the yield loss and a fixed price, insurance demand is also dependent on the correlation of yield and price, and on the density function of revenue. We find that when price and yield are negatively correlated, the incentives to purchase insurance are greater than if they are uncorrelated. Finally, we show that under cases of heavily subsidised crops, farmers may benefit from insurance even if the indemnity scheme is not sufficiently large to compensate for the payment of the premium.
While these results confirm that farmers are attracted to policies with positive expected results, they show that subsidies, both of premia and originating from farm programs, can inducce farmers to purchase insurance that has poor returns. For instance, we show that even in cases of premium misalignments, farmers' would not respond to asymetric information incentives unless price risk is sufficiently high and price and yield negatively correlated. Lastly, we show that, even in a very simple setting, farmers' insuring strategies depend on a dozen of number of parameters. Some are specific of the insurance policies available, and some depend on the price and yields relevant to the grower, in addition to the agent's risk preferences.
From our empirical analyses, we learnt that Spanish farmers' insurance strategies can be explained by their actual and observed individual insurance experience. Three variables describing the observed economic returns from insurance and its variability are enough to explain insurance demand patterns found across widely different agricultural conditions. Noteworthy, the demand parameters are quite stable through time, both using probit specific for single years and count models for 4-year periods. Our results show that farmers respond not only to the expected returns of their insuring strategy, but also to the dispersion or variability of the expected indemnities relative to total paid premium and total liability.
We also developed a few variants of the demand models in order to include in the analyses the observations related to farmers that, even if they show evidence of being active insurees, they have never received an indemnity. Using an inferred measurement of the expected returns, based on each farmer's regional actuarial records, we could estimate an insurance demand model lumping togthether farmers with actual records of indemnities and farmers with inferred records of indemnities. Demand models in this case show sharp similarity to those estimated only with observed data. Again, this implies that farmers repond to the expected returns inferred from the region's actuarial results, and to the variability of the region's relative indemnity scheme.
Obvious avenues for pursuing further the theoretical work are analyse a choice model of insurance coverage. Using the moment generating function, one can use discreet distribution functions as well and compare expected benefits of having a simple crop failure insurance vs. a yield insurance of the type analysed here. In addition, deductibles can also be integrated in the model to compare alternative policies that have different indemnity schemes.
In the empirical area, the analyses carried out here are just a small fraction of the issues that the database invites to look at. We have completely left out promising analyses of the farmers' choice of coverage and more crop-specific insuring strategies. 
Appendix 2
We start by defining ) ( i EU π , and then establish the conditions for 
The EU under the case of no insurance is defined as: With the above results, A5 can be expressed as: 
If β'<0, which is so as long as c>s, the left-hand side of A8 is always negative. Therefore a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for ) ( ) ( π π EU EU i − >0 is that term within the log of the right-hand-side be less than 1. Further algebra allows us to get the sought necessary condition:
Where Im stands for indemnity (Im=p e (y e -y)). All marginal effects assymptotically significant p>0.01 Histograms of Exp_ben_in and Exp_ben>0
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